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MORE THAN JUST WORDS?: THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND
COLOMBIA AND UNASUR
INTERVENTION IN LIGHT OF THE
DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT




IT is going to happen... .We are going to prepare for this, be-
cause the Colombian bourgeoisie hates us. And now, it just isn't
possible to make up. No, it is impossible. The agreement of the
seven bases is a declaration of war against the Bolivarian Revolution."'
This statement by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is just one exam-
ple of the highly verbal combat currently occurring between Venezuela
and Colombia. In light of a defense cooperation agreement between the
United States and Colombia for the occupation of seven military bases
signed in October 2009, there has been a firestorm of aggressive state-
ments made between Colombia and Venezuela, neighboring countries
that already have a tenuous relationship.
The agreement, its origins, and the publicized and unpublicized justifi-
cations for the defense cooperation agreement will be analyzed to predict
what the deal truly holds for Colombia, Venezuela, and the entire South
American region. Further, the volatile history between Colombia and
Venezuela will be examined to determine how those events affect the cur-
rent relationship between the two countries. The recent events between
Colombia and Venezuela, including the previous verbal clashes between
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and Venezuelan President Hugo Cha-
vez, will be examined to determine if the belligerent rhetoric between the
two popular leaders will actually escalate into a war. The current situa-
tion will be compared to past quarrels between the two countries to de-
*Katherine M. Tullos is a J.D. candidate at the SMU Dedman School of Law, 2011
and received a B.A. in political science and psychology cum laude, honors in liberal
arts from SMU in 2008.
1. Chavez: Ready to Cut Ties with Colombia, CNN, Aug. 26, 2009, http://edition.cnn.
com/2009/WORLD/americas/08/26/venezuela.colombia.
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termine how recent events are similar and yet different from events in the
past.
In addition, Colombia's relationship with the Union of South Ameri-
can Nations (UNASUR) will be analyzed to determine the purpose and
role of UNASUR in this conflict. Colombia's continued membership in
the organization in comparison to Colombia's close relationship with the
United States will also be analyzed to explore Colombia's current diplo-
matic isolation in the South American region. It should be noted that
while this analysis unavoidably must examine the relationship between
the United States and Colombia and Venezuela, the focus of this analysis
will be on the relations between Colombia and Venezuela.
II. THE BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT:
COLOMBIA'S CONTROVERSIAL AGREEMENT WITH
THE UNITED STATES
On July 12, 2009, Colombian President Uribe informally announced
that an agreement was almost concluded "on the terms of a decade-long
lease to allow U.S. military personnel to use Colombian military bases to
conduct anti-drug trafficking and anti-terrorism operations."12 The unfin-
ished, and originally unreleased, agreement was quickly opposed by nu-
merous countries within the South American region. 3 Numerous
politicians within Colombia also criticized the agreement arguing that
only the Senate, not President Uribe, had the authority to permit U.S.
troops in Colombia.4
Despite initial concerns regarding this agreement, the United States
and Colombia formally announced on August 14, 2009 that a provisional
agreement had been reached between the United States and Colombia
on a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). 5 The announced agree-
ment was again criticized by other South American countries, especially
by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa, both of whom saw the military bases as a security threat and were
concerned that the U.S. military bases in Colombia would be used to tar-
get their respective countries.6 Even Chile and Brazil, which are consid-
ered to be "moderate Colombian allies," were concerned about the use of
the Colombian military bases and the possibility of U.S. forces extending
beyond Colombia. 7
2. Roque Planas, Colombia: U.S. Bases Stoke the Flames of Regional Conflict, N.
Am. CONGRESS ON LATIN Am. 2009, available at https://nacla.org/node/6058.
3. Eg., id.; Simon Romero, Increased U.S. Military Presence in Colombia Could Pose
Problems with Neighbors, N.Y. TIMrES, July 23, 2009, at A14, available at http:II
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/americas/23colombia.htmi.
4. Planas, supra note 2.
5. U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, U.S. EMBASSY, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://montevideo.usembassy.gov/usaweb/2009/09-238EN.shtml.
6. Diana Delgado, Colombia, U.S. Near Deal on Military Bases, WALL STi. J., Aug. 15,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 12503501531 3134409.htmi.
7. Id.
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During remarks with Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez on
August 18, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodhamn Clinton stated
that Colombia was an important ally of the United States and noted three
important points to offset concerns regarding the DCA. 8 First, Clinton
stressed that the DCA did not create U.S. bases in Colombia, but rather
created only access to seven bases,9 which are reported to include five
military and two naval bases.10 Second, Clinton noted that there would
not be a "significant permanent increase" of U.S. military in Colombia."
Perhaps in response to extreme concerns by Venezuela that "the United
States is planning a war on South America,"'12 Clinton lastly stressed that
the DCA "does not pertain to other countries" and only pertains to "the
bilateral cooperation between the United States and Colombia regarding
security matters within Colombia."'13 In response to a question address-
ing concerns by both Venezuela and Brazil, Clinton reiterated this point
stating that the DCA had "'very clear recognition ot territorial integrity
and sovereignty." 14 In what likely could be considered a response to the
criticisms by Chavez, Clinton noted that people should first understand
the agreement if they were speaking out against it, and that others coun-
tries within the region should help the United States in the fight against
drugs which "threat[ens]. .. .the whole region."'15
Even after the announcement, the United States was on the defensive
regarding the agreement, sending the U.S. State Department's Deputy
Assistant Security for Western Hemisphere Affairs Christopher McMul-
len to meet with his counterparts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to
counter any misunderstandings about the agreement.' 6 A 100-page Pen-
tagon document that was posted on the Internet entitled, "The Budget
Estimate Justification Data for the Military Construction Program of the
U.S. Air Force," (The Air Force Document) has become very controver-
sial as critics of the agreement claim that the document demonstrates the
United States' true intentions for the bases in Colombia. 17 The Air Force
8. Hilary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks with Colombian Foreign
Minister Jaime Bermudez After Their Meeting, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http:I/
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/08/128023.htm.
9. Id.
10. Delgado, supra note 6.
11. Clinton, supra note 8.
12. Juan Forero, South American Leaders Assail U.S. Access to Colombian Military
Bases, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/con ten t/article/2009/08/28/A R2009082803768.h tml.
13. Clinton, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Stephen Kaufman, Agreement on Colombian Bases Does Not Increase U.S. Pres-
ence, AMERICA.GOV, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.america.gov/stlamericas-englisl
2009/September/200909291 85928esnamfuak0.1292383.html.
17. E.g., Christina Equivel & Paulina Serna, New information Emerges on U.S. Leases
of Colombian Military Bases, CUTTING EDGE, Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.thecutting
edgenews.comlindex.php?article=I 1808; Colombia and the United States: Off Base,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/world/americas/
displayStory.cfm?storyjd=15019912.
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Document states the "possibility of using Colombia as a staging post"
with the example of using the base to respond to a natural disaster.' 8
While the example illustrates that the base will be used to respond to a
natural disaster, critics of the base fear that the bases would be used as a
staging post for other situations to counter against "anti-U.S. govern-
ments."' 9 For example, the document stated the possibility of using the
bases to counter possible attacks from neighboring countries, which is
suspected to refer to Venezuela. 20 Therefore, "the [Air Force] document
appears to validate the persistent reservations expressed by Colombia's
neighbors, particularly Venezuela, in regards to the real motivation and
potential scope of the DCA."12' The Air Force Document has been taken
off the Internet since its initial publication.22 Thus, this lack of trans-
parency only further suggests to Venezuela and other critics of the DCA
that the United States is covering up its true intentions regarding the
DCA.
On October 30, 2009, the DCA, which was titled a Supplemental
Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance and Security
(SACTA) and renamed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),
was signed by the United States and Colombia and subsequently entered
into force.23 Although the United States has issued a fact sheet,24 press
releases, and numerous public statements 25 regarding the DCA, the text
of the document was only released to the public on November 3, 2010,
which was months after its initial announcement.26 The thirteen page
DCA is organized into twenty-five articles that touch on issues such as
"Access, Use, and Ownership of Agreed Facilities and Locations," "Pay-
ment of Fees," "Respect for Domestic Law, ". .Tax Treatment," and "Fa-
cilitation of Aircraft Riders."127 The DCA states that it "shall remain in
force for an initial period of ten (10) years" and will be renewable for
additional periods of ten years through review and agreement by both
18. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
19. Equivel & Serna, supra note 17.
20. Obama's Disappointing Year in Latin America: Interview with Julia E. Sweig,
Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin American Studies and Di-
rector for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 12, 2010,
available a at http://www.cfr.org/publication/21177/obamas-disappointingyearin-
latin-america.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication-list%3Ftype%
3D3interview [hereinafter Interview with Julia E. Sweig].
21. Equivel & Serna, supra note 17.
22. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
23. Fabio Valencia Cossio, the Minister of Interior and Justice, and Gabriel Silva Lu-
jan, the Minister of National Defense, signed the document for Colombia. Signing
of the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, U.S. EMBASSY, Oct. 30,
2009, http://montevideo.usembassy.gov/usaweb/2009/09-298EN.shtm; Supplemen-
tal Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Defense and Security
Between the Governments of the United States of America and The Republic of
Colombia, U.S-Colom., Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organizationl131654.pdf [hereinafter DCAJ.
24. Signing of the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, supra note 23.
25. Clinton, supra note 8.
26. Equivel & Serna, supra note 17.
27. DCA, supra note 23, at 1.
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Colombia and the United States.28 Overall, the text of the DCA is
vague, 29 which was perhaps the intention of the United States so they
would be able to broaden the scope of authority of the DCA if necessary,
and may demonstrate why Venezuela may be reading more into the
DCA.
III. VENEZUELA'S LONG HISTORY OF CONFLICT
WITH COLOMBIA
Colombia and Venezuela share not only a 1,375 mile border, but also a
common, volatile history.30 The history of the two neighboring countries
is important because it demonstrates that the countries, while they expe-
rience a history of disputes, are interdependent. Thus, it is crucial for the
two countries to cooperate. Further, it shows the trend of having "a
strong centralist authority" 3' in the region, which can be seen today
through Venezuelan President Chavez, whose rhetoric can be partially
blamed for the escalating tension and conflict.
Both countries were first colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth cen-
tury.32 In the 19th century, Simon Bolivar, a revolutionary from Vene-
zuela, liberated the two countries from Spanish imperialism. 33 Bolivar
organized a country that lasted ten years called Gran Colombia, which
was made up of four liberated states: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Panama.34 In 1830, the country was split, resulting in the formation of the
Republic of New Grenada (which is now Colombia) and the Republic of
Venezuela.3 5 Border disputes between the two countries existed begin-
ning in 1833, which required international negotiation from the King of
Spain in 1891 and the Swiss in 1916.36 More recently, the two countries
were close to going to war in 1987 regarding a "dispute over a maritime
border in the Caribbean Gulf."37
Colombia has been involved in a decade long diplomatic dispute with
Venezuela that has been dubbed the "'Cold War' of the Andes." 38 While
the threatening nature of the relationship between Colombia and Vene-
zuela should be taken seriously, the history of the dispute between the
28. Id. at art. xxv.
29. See e.g., What Have You Done for Me Lately?, Center for Int'l Pol'y's Colom.
Program, Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=1216; DCA, supra note 23.
30. FACTBOX: History of Tensions Between Venezuela, Colombia, REUTERS, Nov. 4,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A343F20091104 [hereinafter
FACTBOX].
31. GEOFF SIMONS, COLOMBIA: A BRUTAL HISTORY 23 (2004).
32. E.g., FACTBOX, supra note 30; SIMONS, supra note 31, at 18-22.
33. E.g., FACTBOX, supra note 30; SIMONS, supra note 31, at 22.
34. Arthur M. Birken, Gulf of Venezuela: Border Dispute, 6 LAW. OF THE AM. 52, 53
(1974); SIMONs, supra note 31, at 23-24.
35. Birken, supra note 34.
36. Id. at 53-54.
37. Patrick Markey, Tensions Escalate Between Colombia and Venezuela, REUTERS,
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/articlelidUSTRE5BJl1Z20091220.
38. Patrick Markey, Analysis: Andean "Cold War" Raises Risks for Colombia, Vene-
zuela, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSNO6180988.
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two countries demonstrates that war is unlikely in this situation. In 2005,
the "most serious diplomatic crisis between neighbors who are ideological
opposites" occurred when Colombia arrested a Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerilla army leader, Rodrigo Granda, who
had been able to hide out in Venezuela for years despite being wanted by
the Colombian government. 39 In response, Chavez "pulled his ambassa-
dor from Bogota, [Colombia], cancelled bilateral accords and demanded
an unreserved apology" from Uribe.40 Like in the current situation, the
United States was at the center of the dispute because the Bush adminis-
tration verbally supported Colombia and even stated that Venezuela was
a "'negative' force" and "governs in an illiberal way." 4 1 This event,
which threatened to become a serious incident, was resolved within a
month with a mere agreement and press release that didn't explain how
the resolution actually occurred. 42
In November 2007, after "Colombia's government abruptly halted
Chavez's mediation efforts to release hostages held by rebels in the Co-
lombian jungle," Chavez said that reconciliation was "impossible" with
Uribe and that their relations were in the "most serious crisis." 43 Chavez
also stated that Uribe's action in stopping the negotiations was a spit in
Chavez's face.44 At the time, international news media stated that the
dialogue was a "sharp break" for two leaders who had just one month
earlier in October appeared together smiling, hugging each other, speak-
ing of their "sister nations," and opening a natural gas pipeline between
the two countries. 45 Within one month, Chavez's and Uribe's relation-
ship plummeted from "the most favorable moment for relations between
the two countries since they separated in 1830" to the "most serious
crisis." 46
In March 2008, Colombia bombed a suspected FARC guerilla camp
and killed a top FARC leader in Ecuador,47 which prompted Venezuela
to move troops to the border.48 Colombia threatened to go to the Inter-
39. E.g., Juan Forero, Capture of Rebel Divides Latin American Neighbors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/23/international/americas/23
colombia.html; FACTBOX, supra note 30.
40. James T. Kimer, Venezuela/Colombia: Relations Turn Carnal, 38 NACLA Ri''. ON
'rHI AM. 45 (2005), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lP3-803084811.
html.
41. Forero, supra note 39.
42. Colombia, Venezuela Settle Row, CNN, Jan. 29, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/americas/01/29/colombia.venezuela/index.html.
43. James Sturcke, Colombia-Venezuela Relations Head Towards Deep Freeze,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/26/vene-
zuela.colombia.
44. Id.
45. E.g., id.; Simon Romero, Leaders of Venezuela and Colombia, Ideological Oppo-
sites, Are Tightening Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
10/19/world/americas/191atin.htmi.
46. E.g., Romero, supra note 45; Sturcke, supra note 43.
47. Saul Hudson, Chavez Warns of "War" if Colombia Strikes Venezuela, REUTERS,
Mar. 1, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN126952620080302.
48. Markey, supra note 37.
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national Criminal Court (ICC) claiming that Venezuela was "abetting ge-
nocide" because of an allegation that Venezuela was assisting the
FARC.49 Again, what initially seemed to be a serious incident was
quickly resolved within a week and with only a handshake. 50 Then, Uribe
visited Venezuela to meet with Chavez in July 2008.51 Subsequently, all
three countries reopened their embassies, which had been previously
closed during the dispute.52 However, the relationship between Colom-
bia and Ecuador is still considered tense even though the event is consid-
ered resolved. 53
As the recent history between Colombia and Venezuela demonstrates,
there is a constant ebb and flow of diplomatic relations with increasingly
negative and then positive rhetoric used by the leaders themselves and
the news media to describe the current situation.
IV. VENEZUELA'S RECENT CONFLICT WITH COLOMBIA
OVER THE DCA
Immediately following the informal announcement of the DCA in July
2009, Chavez cancelled a summit with Uribe stating that he would need
to "reassess" Venezuela's relations with Colombia.54 Chavez also stated
that he considered the agreement as an "aggression" against Venezuela. 55
Colombia verbally combated Chavez's allegations by arguing that Vene-
zuela should not interfere with Colombia's relationship with the United
States considering Colombia has never interfered with trying to halt Ven-
ezuela's relationship with foreign countries, especially Venezuela's rela-
tionship with China and Russia.56
The prevailing dispute between the two countries involves an allegation
by both the United States and Colombia that Chavez and Venezuela are
supporting the FARC through both arms and logistical help.5 7 Colombia
has been involved in a "four-decade-old guerilla conflict" between the
Colombian government and the FARC, 58 which was formed "in 1964 as a
communist-inspired peasant army."159 The United States alleges that the
49. Adam Isacson, The Colombia- Venezuela-Ecuador Tangle, OPEN DEMOCRACY,
Mar. 17. 2008, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy-power/the-cO-
lombia-venezuela-ecuadorjtangle.
50. Markey, supra note 38.
51. Timeline: Venezuela, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1229348.stm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
52. Isacson, supra note 49.
53. Planas, supra note 2.
54. Chris Kaul, Colombia- Venezuela Relations Fall Further with Rocket Revelation,
L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/Jul/28/world/fg-colom-
bia-rockets28.
55. Romero, supra note 3.
56. Id.; see also Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story-id=
14848972.
57. FACTB OX, supra note 30.
58. Id.
59. FACTBOX:- Key Facts on Colombia's FARC Rebels, REUJTERS, Dec. 22, 2009,
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINndia-44923320091222.
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FARC is able to continue their operations in Colombia through safe
havens in the jungle terrain along the borders with Ecuador, Panama, and
Venezuela. 60 In response to these allegations of support, Chavez repeat-
edly denies helping the FARC.6 1 As noted above, recent events in 2005
with the capture of Rodrigo Granda, and the halting of negotiations in
2007, are a part of this continuing conflict.
This dispute has only been furthered by the recent confirmation by
Uribe on July 26, 2009 that the Colombian military had seized from the
FARC AT4 antitank weapons, which had serial numbers from the manu-
facturer that were registered to the Venezuelan government. 62 Under a
final-destination agreement between Venezuela and the manufacturer,
these weapons were forbidden from being exported to another country
without notification.63 The Venezuelan government, through Interior
Minister Tarek El Aissami, denied allegations that Venezuela had given
the weapons, which had been sold to Venezuela, to the FARC.64 Chavez
denied the allegations stating that "anyone can take a rifle and put a Ven-
ezuelan seal and serial number on it."165 Some have noted that the serial
numbers do not confirm that the Venezuelan government initially sold
the weapons to the FARC considering corrupt Venezuelan military of-
ficers often resell arms.66 Regardless of whether Venezuela did intention-
ally sell the weapons to the FARC, this event further complicated the
fragile relationship between Colombia and Venezuela.
On July 28, 2009, Venezuela suspended all diplomatic relations with
Colombia. 67 While this event is significant and represents the two coun-
tries' unstable relationship, it must be looked at in the context that Cha-
vez has recalled his diplomats from Colombia three times since 2005.68
Subsequently, Chavez froze all imports from Colombia into Vene-
zuela. 69 Then in early November 2009, Chavez declared on television to
the Venezuelan people: "let's not waste a day on our main aim: to pre-
pare for war and to help the people prepare for war."170 Chavez subse-
quently ordered over 15,000 national guard troops to Venezuela's border,
some to the border with Colombia. 7' Even though Chavez ordered the
troop movement, Venezuela lacks the resources, such as trucks and air-
60. Kaufman, supra note 16.
61. FACTB OX, supra note 30.
62. Kaul, supra note 54.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Planas, supra note 2.
66. Kaul, supra note 54.
67. UNASUR Meeting Tackles Colombian- Venezuela Spat, AGE, Nov. 28, 2009, http://
news. theage.com. aulbreak ing-news-world/u nasur-meeti ng-tack les-colombi anvene-
zuela-spat-20091128-jxvw.html.
68. FACTROX, supra note 30.
69. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
70. Timeline of the Colombia- Venezuela Conflict, Jus-r THE FACis, Dec. 4, 2009, http:II
justf.org/blog/2009/12/04timeline-colombia-venezuela-conflict.
71. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
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planes, to actually relocate the large number of troops.72 Therefore, it is
not clear how many troops actually arrived.73
In December 2009, Chavez alleged that a spy plane entered into Vene-
zuelan territory when it flew near a military base in Zulia, which is on the
Venezuela-Colombia border.74 Chavez indirectly accused the United
States as the origin of the spy plane, stating that the type of plane was a
"technology of the empire" of the United States.75 Therefore, Chavez
ordered that the army shoot down any other plane if it entered Vene-
zuela. 76 In response, the Colombian Defense Minister Gabriel Silva
joked that "Venezuelan soldiers mistook Father Christmas's sleigh for a
spy plane" because the alleged invasion occurred in the week before the
Christmas holiday.77 More seriously, Silva dismissed Chavez's claims
stating that Colombia does not have the capability to fly the alleged espi-
onage mission that Chavez alleges.78 In response, Colombia formally
protested the allegations made by Chavez. 79 The United States also de-
nied Chavez's allegations, noting that the last time the United States acci-
dentally entered into Venezuelan controlled airspace occurred in 1988.80
In April 2010, Venezuela arrested eight Colombians on charges of
"1spying."18' Venezuela claims that the Colombians were taking photo-
graphs of restricted electricity areas as part of an effort to impair the
country's electricity grid.82 Uribe has argued that Venezuela has violated
these individual's human rights, stating: "Colombia cannot permit viola-
tions of human rights against its citizens, whether they live in Colombia
or elsewhere."183
Thus, the recent events between Colombia and Venezuela have
brought concerns that a violent war may erupt between the two countries.
The international community, especially the countries in the Latin Amer-
ican region, has increasingly focused its attention on this escalating situa-
tion to determine what, if anything, can be done to alleviate some of the
tension between Colombia and Venezuela.
72. Id.
73. Id.




77. Colombia to Chavez: Maybe 'Spy Plane' Was Santa, ABC NiEws, Dec. 21, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9396310.
78. Id.
79. Colombia Protest Over Venezuela, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2fhi/americas/8484848.stm.
80. US Denies Its Warplanes Violated Venezuelan Airspace, AFP, Jan. 4, 2010, http:I/
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gyfK6wyfWm-2fXOYpkExdQ
CAaQBw.
81. Will Grant, Venezuela Accuses Colombians of Spying and Sabotage, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 6, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8606359.stm.
82. Id.
83. Luis Jaime Acosta, Colombia Blasts Arrests of Spies by Venezuela, REUrERS, Apr.
7, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63650020100407.
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V. INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNASUR IN THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA
The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), "a regional body
aimed at boosting economic and political integration in the region"
formed in 2008, has been very focused on the DCA and the resulting
issues between its two member countries.84 In addition to Colombia and
Venezuela, the members of UNASUR are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay.85
Some of the goals of UNASUR listed in the preamble to the UNASUR
constitution are to "build a South American identity and citizenship,"
"promote the sustainable development and wellbeing of our peoples,"
and to strengthen "multilateralism and the rule of law in international
relations." 86 UNASUR was created during a time when Chavez and
Uribe were bitterly disputing Colombia's claims that Venezuela was as-
sisting the FARC rebels in Colombia.87 Therefore, the lofty goals of
UNASUR were from the start considered unattainable because of the
tensions between some of the UNASUR members.88
On September 15, 2009, a UNASUR meeting was held in Quito, Ecua-
dor to review and question the details of the DCA. 89 Although Uribe
had previously promised to show the actual contents of the DCA to the
UNASUR Defense Council, Uribe later retracted this statement.90 Fur-
ther, Uribe stressed that the UNASUR could not revise the DCA. 91
Most importantly for the relations between the Colombia and UNASUR,
Colombia reportedly threatened to leave UNASUR, 92 which has been
supported by some in Colombia.93 Supposedly, this UNASUR meeting
and another previous meeting, held in August 2009, were aimed at pres-
suring Chavez and Uribe to diplomatically "negotiate and debate instead
of the increasingly common practice [between the two countries] of utter-
ing threats and moving troops to the border." 94 As discussed later, UN-
SUAR foresaw the downward spiral of diplomatic relations between the
84. South America Nations Found Union, BBC Nuws, May 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/7417896.stm.
85. Id.
86. South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty, May 23, 2008, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/csn/treaty.htm [hereinafter UNASUR
Treaty].
87. South America Nations Found Union, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. Freddy Osorio-Ramirez, Colombia-U.S. Military Cooperation Agreement Attracts





93. Gustavo Silva Cano, UNASUR, the Worthless, COLom. REPORTS, Nov. 30, 2009,
http://colombiareports.com/opinion/131 -gustavo-silva-cano71 01 -unasur-the-
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94. Osorio-Ramirez, supra note 89.
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two countries and these negotiations may have been able to somewhat
halt the diminishing relations.
Colombia refused to send its senior officials to another UNASUR
meeting on November 27, 2009.95 Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime
Bermudez defended his country's deliberate decision to only send a tech-
nical delegation of junior officers 96 because "'the recent escalation in
threats against the Colombian government' had made it 'impossible to
hold respectful discussions during the meeting." 97 In response, Vene-
zuela argued that Colombia's lack of attendance at the meeting was a
"huge mistake and an act of contempt towards [UNASUR]."198 Uribe's
overall lack of communication with UNASUR seems to only be further
hindering Colombia's relations with the region and is "providing argu-
ments for Venezuela to accelerate its arms race." 99 Uribe's lack of com-
munication has prompted Chavez to reason "what could we do if the
Yanquis [referring to the United States] are establishing seven military
bases?"100 Clinton also sent a letter to UNASUR to calm the concerns of
the UNASUR member countries stating that the DCA is being con-
ducted "with total respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the other countries."101 While Venezuela and other countries in the re-
gion still seemed unconvinced about the scope of the DCA, at least Ecua-
dor and Brazil seemed to be satisfied by Clinton's letter, which the
Brazilian minister Celso Amorin described as "a text that plainly guaran-
tee[d] no extraterritorial intervention. "' 0 2 Despite these statements from
Clinton, Venezuela stated that it didn't want this guarantee to turn into a
joke.' 03 Therefore, the agreement between the United States and Colom-
bia has large scale implications for the entire region, especially for the
relations between UNASUR member states.
VI. ANALYSIS REGARDING THE DCA: THE NECESSITY OF
THE DCA, THE LIKELIHOOD OF A "FULL-FLEDGED" WAR
BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA, POSSIBLE
PERMANENT TRADE IMPLICATIONS SPILLING FROM THE
DCA, AND THE ROLE OF UNASUR IN THIS CONFLICT
Considering the argument between Colombia and Venezuela that has
occurred as the result of this DCA, it is important to analyze the potential
consequences which may arise. The spectrum of these consequences can
range from short-term conflict and trade implications, to mass conflict
95. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
96. Id.
97. UNASUR Meeting Tackles Colombian- Venezuela Spat, supra note 67.
98. Id.
99. Osorio-Ramnirez, supra note 89.
100. Equivel & Serna, supra note 17.
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with major implications for the United States and the entire Latin Ameri-
can region. Thus, the first consideration should be whether this alliance
was even necessary for continued U.S.-Colombian relations. Second,
there must be an analysis of whether a war is likely to erupt between
Colombia and Venezuela from this conflict, or if this just another conflict
in a series of threats and conflicts that are resolved quickly. Third, there
must be an analysis of the potential for massive trade and economic con-
sequences of the conflict. Fourth, there must be a determination of what
actions, if any, Colombia should take to address this conflict with its
neighbors in the Latin American region through UNASUR.
A. WAS THE UNITED STATES' ALLIANCE WITH COLOMBIA
NECESSARY?: THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, THE DCA BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA
Instead of making the DCA with Colombia, the United States should
have continued the relations with Colombia under Plan Colombia and
the 1952 military assistance agreement with Colombia, without an addi-
tional bilateral agreement between the two countries.104 Plan Colombia
is a decade long relationship between the United States and Colombia "in
which the United States has assisted the country in fighting drug traffick-
ing, ending civil conflict, fostering economic growth[,] and strengthening
the rule of law."1105 Even the United States Defense Assistant Secretary
McMullen has admitted that the agreement merely "formalizes access
that we've had on an ad hoc basis the whole time of Plan Colombia." 106
McMullen stated that the DCA was initiated because of the extensive
time and effort required to negotiate the daily terms of the American use
of the Colombian bases.107 But, considering the even more extensive
time and effort necessary to form, revise, publicize, and defend a formal
bilateral agreement, this argument does not hold. The preamble of the
DCA specifically notes former agreements and memorandum of under-
standings made from 1952 to 2007.108 President Barack Obama even
stated: "[w]e have had a security agreement with Colombia for many
years now. We have updated that agreement." 109 Therefore, it does not
seem like a necessary agreement if the two countries were already coop-
eratively and successfully working to achieve the goals of the DCA.
Accordingly, American officials "ruefully agree that they should have
thought about the regional response to an agreement they now say was
not necessary.""10 Rather than needing the bilateral agreement to con-
tinue having military bases in Colombia, it seemed like the Colombian
104. See Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
105. Kaufman, supra note 16.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. DCA, supra note 23.
109. John Otis, U.S. Military Base Plan Puts Colombia in Hot Water, TIME, Aug. 12,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article0,8599,1915825,00.html.
110. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
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government insisted on having a formal agreement in order to ensure
their own safety in Latin America.' The agreement was likely advo-
cated by the Colombian government in order to deter Chavez "from
launching the war he has seemed rhetorically to threaten against Colom-
bia" considering the agreement "was far cheaper [for Colombia] than try-
ing to match Mr. Chavez's arms build-up, which has included orders for
24 Sukhoi ground attack jets, 55 military helicopters, 92 tanks and air
defense missiles."'"2 Further, Colombia lacked the capital to even hope
to compete with the arms that have been amassed by its neighbors.' 1 3
Thus, this agreement allowed Colombia to avoid worrying about how to
accumulate more and more arms." 4 Therefore, this may demonstrate
Colombia's true intentions to initiating the DCA.
However, if America did not need the agreement to continue its mili-
tary presence in Colombia, it seems unlikely that America would step out
so far and expose itself to diplomatic liability by making a highly publi-
cized bilateral agreement with an unstable country in a volatile region.
Rather, America seems like it wanted to make the agreement with Co-
lombia to legally guarantee its own military presence in the Latin Ameri-
can region after Ecuador decided not to renew its ten-year old agreement
with the United States for access to an air base in Manta, Ecuador that
was used for counter-narcotics surveillance." 5 Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa supposedly wanted to end the agreement because he did
not like U.S. military presence within the country." 6 Correa's close rela-
tionship with and influence from Chavez likely played a role in Correa
ending the agreement with the United States."17
Even though American officials claim that the new base at Palanquero,
Colombia is "not a direct replacement" for the base in Ecuador, 118 the
actions in Latin America demonstrate otherwise. First, the base in Ecua-
dor was closed only a month before the DCA with Colombia was
formed." 9 Second, the planes that had previously been based in Manta,
Ecuador are now at Colombian bases, along with other bases in Panama
and El Salvador, for surveillance.'120 Third, Obama's defense budget for
2010 allocated $46 million to upgrade Palanquero '1 2 1 begging the ques-
tion of whether this large sum of money is needed to outfit the new base
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Equivel & Serna, supra note 17.
114. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
115. Stephen Kaufman, Loss of Ecuador Base Leaves Gap in Counternarcotics Surveil-
lance, AME-RICA.Gov, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.america.gov/stlpeacesec-english/
2009lNovember/20091 lO91O3908esnamfuakO.81 7791 2.html.
116. Id.
117. Correa admits he is a "personal friend" of Chavez, but argues that Chavez is not in
control of him. Profile: Ecuador's Rafael Correa, BBC NFws, Apr. 27, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6187364.stm.
118. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
119. See Kaufman, supra note 115.
120. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
121. Otis, supra note 109.
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for these planes from Ecuador. Therefore, it seems like America directly
made the agreement with Colombia because it needed another key mili-
tary alliance in Latin America after it was ousted from Ecuador.' 22
Rather than announcing this smart and justified decision to maintain
presence in the region, the United States is couching this intention by
arguing that the DCA only formalizes relationships between the two
countries.
Regardless of the reasoning for the agreement, the United States likely
should have avoided making this agreement if it was not absolutely neces-
sary, in spite of Colombia's insistence, to avoid being the catalyst to a
situation that could erupt into war.
B. MERELY WORDS OR WILL VIOLENCE AND ESCALATING PROBLEMS
EMERGE?: THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACTUAL WAR EMERGING BETWEEN
COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA
While this event is serious and should be handled with diplomatic care,
this event is unlikely to erupt into a major war and will likely be resolved
like the other disputes without a violent war occurring. Like in the past,
Chavez "may be ramping up the rhetoric over an external threat to dis-
tract [Venezuelan citizens] from domestic problems, such as high inflation
and water and power shortages, and to project his international pres-
ence."'123 For example, recent events demonstrate Chavez's mounting
problems:
Since November 2, [2009] water has been rationed in Venezuela; the
same day on which the government introduced a plan to save elec-
tricity. In Caracas, [Venezuela] each of the city's neighborhoods is
without running water for at least two days every week. Ch~ivez has
urged the public to take 'lightening showers' of just three minutes,
and to become accustomed to bathing in the early hours of the morn-
ing, armed with a flashlight. Even before these recent austerity mea-
sures, in early October, Datandlisis found 66 percent of Venezuelans
dissatisfied with the government's moves to resolve the electricity
crisis. Moreover, the same survey found '70 percent critical of Chdi-
vez's policies to create employment' and that 87 percent thought the
government had done little to ensure the personal security of its
citizens. 124
Further, Chavez seems to be attempting to place blame on the electric-
ity crisis on Colombia by stating that the problem is partly due to sabo-
tage by Colombia.' 25 Therefore, Chavez seems to have a loud bark, but
does not seem willing or able to back that up with any action. For exam-
122. Interview with Julia E. Sweig, supra note 20.
123. Markey, supra note 38.
124. Guy Hursthouse, DI~jd vu in Venezuelan-Colombian Relations, as War of Words
Reign ites: What Next for Chavez?, COUNCIL. ON HEMISPIERic AFFAIRS, Nov. 20,
2009, http://www.coha.org/deja-vu-in-venezuelan-colombian-relations-as-war-of-
words-reignites-what-next-for-chavez/.
125. Grant, supra note 81.
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pie, as described above, Chavez threatened war against Colombia in the
past if forces struck inside Venezuela, called Uribe a pawn of the United
States, and then just a week later resolved the dispute with a hand-
shake. 126 But, it has been argued that this situation is "far more danger-
ous" than the situations in the past. 127
Chavez likely would not follow up his threats because if an actual war
were to break out, Colombia would likely win considering its experience
in fighting the FARC and its aid from America, not to mention the pres-
ence of American military forces in the country. 128 Venezuela's only ad-
vantage "would be a quick air strike, using recently acquired Russian
Sukhoi jets."1129 Considering that Venezuela does not even have the re-
sources to get thousands of Venezuelan troops to the border areas, it is
unlikely that Venezuela would have the resources to move troops and
supplies to the border for a full out war.' 30 Further, as discussed below,
Venezuela, especially Chavez, does not have the political and popular
support to successfully launch a coordinated attack against Colombia.' 3 '
Because Chavez realizes his slim chances in an actual war, Chavez is
using hyped -up rhetoric to create a verbal war to garner public opin-
ion.132 But, Chavez is losing this "war" as a survey in Venezuela deter-
mined that eighty-percent of Venezuelans opposed a war with Colombia
and most also opposed trade sanctions with Colombia.' 33 Another prob-
lem is that the international community does not seem to take Chavez or
his threats seriously. For example, U.S. President Barack Obama dis-
missed Chavez's concerns stating that some within the region are merely
"trying to play this up as part of a traditional anti-Yankee rhetoric."'134
Therefore, the international community, including Venezuela, may not be
readily preparing for the possibility of war especially considering that the
"constant[ ] talk of war sometimes trigger[s] it, accidentally or on pur-
pose."1135 If Venezuela were to launch an attack, Colombia thus would be
highly dependent on U.S. assistance in the terms of military supplies and
resources, troops, and equipment such as tanks.
Even though war is unlikely there likely will be more violence along
the Venezuelan-Colombian border.136 Already since the DCA was initi-
126. E.g., Chavez Warns of "War" if Colombia Strikes Venezuela, REUTERS, Mar. 1,
2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN01 26952620080302; Markey, supra note
38.
127. Hursthouse, supra note 124.
128. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. "If a war would be near-impossible for Venezuela to win given the inferiority of its
armed forces against a combined Colombian-U.S. defense force, it would be even
harder for the effort to succeed without popular support." Hursthouse, supra note
124.
132. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
133. Id.
134. Otis, supra note 109.
135. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
136. Markey, supra note 38.
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ated there has been "the kidnap and murder of 11 men, eight of them
Colombian, the murder of two Venezuelan national guardsmen; deporta-
tions of undocumented migrants and the arrest on both sides of alleged
spies."' 37 The two Venezuelan national guardsmen were shot in the back
while doing routine tasks for their job during the day on November 4,
2009.138 The economic tensions described below will continue to escalate
the border region, where troops have already been called.
Venezuela may be attempting to escalate the tension with Colombia
because of its overlapping tension with the United States. Chavez
crudely stated that the reason for the DCA was because "with the elec-
tion of Obama and the Democrats in Congress, Uribe began to fear he'd
lose the support that he had from Bush, and he dropped his pants due to
the fear of losing the backing of the United States."' 39 While Uribe was
undoubtedly looking for security of support from the new U.S. adminis-
tration, this statement demonstrates not only the shocking rhetoric of
Chavez but also demonstrates the long-term tension between the United
States and Chavez.
While Venezuela has been quick to blame the DCA and the United
States for the "regional instability," Congressman Eliot Engel, the Chair-
man of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemi-
sphere, has aptly noted that the regional instability has really been caused
by Chavez's "increasingly bellicose words" and "negative rhetoric against
the U.S. and our allies in Latin America and around the world [which]
continues almost unabated every day."140 Congressman Engel further ar-
gued that the "real challenge for regional stability lies in President Cha-
vez's increasingly cozy relationship with Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad," who is aiming to use Venezuela "as a bridge to help Iran
build relations with other Latin American countries." 141 Chavez has sup-
posedly wanted to ease Venezuela's tension with the United States, yet at
the same time criticized the United States' efforts in the Haiti earthquake
relief and accused the United States of spying.142
This situation between Colombia and Venezuela is just a "war of
137. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
138. Kariz Janicke, Venezuela-Colombia Dispute Reaches WTO, Border Closed After 2
Venezuelan Troops Shot Dead, VENEz. ANALYSIs, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.
venezuelanalysis.com/news/4912.
139. Chavez Seeks Improved Relations with U.S., NEWSVINE, Jan. 17, 2010, http://www.
newsvine.com/_news/2010/01/17/3770683-chavez-seeks-improved-relations-with-us.
140. Rep. Eliot Engel, Chavez Destabilizes Region; Don't Blame U.S., Colombia, THE
HI-i-, Nov. 23, 2009, http://thehill.com/opinion/etters/69209-chavez-destabiizes-
region-dont-blame-us-colombia-.
141. Id.
142. Chavez Seeks Improved Relations with US, supra note 139; see also Christopher
Toothaker, Venezuela's Chavez Expresses Hope for Diplomatic Breakthrough with
Colombia, WASHINGTON EXAMINER, Apr. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonexam-
iner.com/world/venezuelas-chavez-says-hes-hoping-for-diplomatic-breakthrough-
with-colombia-92058269.html (stating that Chaves hopes for better relations with
Venezuela in the future).
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words,"'143 rather than an actual violent war. Uribe and Chavez are polit-
ical opposites because they come from two sides of the political spectrum
with Uribe being a conservative lawyer 144 and Chavez being a "fiery left-
ist revolutionary.114 5 As noted above, Chavez has recalled his diplomats
from Colombia three times since 2005,146 which demonstrates that Cha-
vez quickly resends his diplomats after a conflict occurs and diplomats are
recalled. Chavez even expelled the United Ambassador to Venezuela
giving him a mere seventy-two hours to leave Venezuela in September
2008147 only to restore the ambassador in April 2009 after he shook hands
with President Barack Obama. 148 Just as Chavez has called Colombia's
actions an "aggression" against Venezuela, he also accused the Nether-
lands in December 2009 of aggression for permitting the United States to
have access to airports in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. 149 Even further,
Colombia claimed that it was freezing relations with Spain in 2007 after
the Spanish King, Juan Carlos, supposedly told him to "shut up" during a
meeting. 150
Thus, Chavez seems to be making increasingly erratic behavior to gar-
ner international attention in the short-term without credibility to his
claims or statements, which he singularly reverses. Considering war has
not emerged from these verbal threats with the Netherlands and Spain, it
demonstrates the unlikelihood of war in this situation. However, it
should be noted that the relationship between Colombia and Venezuela is
historically more tenuous and recent violence shifts this situation into
more of a possibility than the situation with Spain or the Netherlands. 151
In what could not be a better analogy, the Council on Hemispheric
Affairs noted that "Chavez may have cried wolf one too many times" for
anyone to believe that he is actually threatening war.152 Remarkably,
Uribe has been noticeably calm in response these continuous verbal
threats by Chavez. 153 He and the rest of the Colombian government un-
doubtedly recognize the threats are unsupported and thus are unwilling
to escalate the conflict even more with retaliatory responses. In the past,
143. Hursthouse, supra note 124.
144. Markey, supra note 38.
145. Bogota Files UN Complaint Against Chavez, TAIPFI TiMIES, Nov. 13, 2009, http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/1 1/13/2003458343.
146. FACTB OX, supra note 30.
147. Alleging Plot, Chavez Expels U.S. Diplomat, N.Y. Timi-s, Sept. 12, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/world/americas/12iht-1 2bolivia.16089979.html.
148. Michael van der Gallen, Obama's Handshake Pays Off: Chavez Vows to Restore
Ambassador to U.S., POLIGA/zTE, Apr. 19, 2009, http://www.poligazette.com/
2009/04/19/obamas-handshake-pays-off-chavez-vows-to-restore-ambassador-to-us/.
149. Markey, supra note 37; see also U.S. Denies Its Warplanes Violated Venezuelan
Airspace, supra note 80 (in response to allegations by Chavez that a plane entered
into Venezuelan airspace in December 2009, "the Netherlands also rejected accu-
sations that the United States was using the islands to mount military operations
against Venezuela, calling the allegations 'unfair, baseless[,] and fanatical"').
150. Sturcke, supra note 43.
151. See FACTB OX, supra note 30.
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Uribe has been less willing to stand back idly while Chavez makes bully-
ing statements.'15 4 However, this time he may have remained quiet in
order to gain "domestic political mileage out of the verbal sparring." 55
Uribe's supporters had been attempting to pass a constitutional amend-
ment that would permit him to run for a third term when his second term
ends in August 2010.156
Some of Chavez's bullying threats during the past few months include:
"if you hurt Venezuela you'll regret it. We are not unarmed. We do not
have our arms crossed;"'157 stating that the DCA is an "open aggression;"
declaring that any "attack" would trigger "a 100-year war;"'158 and calling
Uribe "a mafioso" and a "little Yankee."' 59 His statements have been
increasingly threatening; so much so that The Economist stated: "Hugo
Chavez's belligerent rhetoric trades at a substantial discount."'160
Chavez's threatening language is discounted not only because it is ex-
treme, but also because it is unsupported by any concrete evidence. For
example, Chavez cannot point to any specific language in the DCA to
prove that the DCA is threatening his country because the DCA does not
address attacking Venezuela.'16 ' Furthermore, one of Chavez's biggest
stated concerns is an increase in the number of American troops in Co-
lombia and the Latin American region.'162 His concern, however, has
been blown out of proportion considering the evidence and statements
made by the United States:
The American military presence in Colombia has recently declined,
partly because theDemocrats in Congress have cut annual military
aid by 70 [million], to around 320 [million]. The number of Ameri-
can troops is now around 250, down from a peak of 570 in early 2007.
154. In 2007, Uribe told Chavez "If you are spreading an expansionist project on the
continent, in Colombia this project will make no headway... .You can't bully the
continent and set it on fire as you do, speaking against Spain one day, against the
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bly the Bitterest Conflict in a Century, IPS Ni--ws, Nov. 26, 2007, http://ipsnews.netI
news. asp? idnews=40220.
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http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/articlel9ll67.ece.
156. Uribe's Third Term, WALL STr. J., Nov. 20.,2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBIOO
01424052748704204304574543904038401172.html. However, Uribe is not running
for a third term after all. It is unclear who will be elected to be the next President
of Colombia when Uribe's term ends in August and the effect this would have on
the relations between the two countries. If the next President is former defense
minister Manuel Santos, the relations between the two countries may only further
deteriorate. Chavez has stated: "Santos could cause a war in this part of the
world." Toothaker, supra note 142; see also Grant, supra note 81 (noting that
claims of spying and arrest continue, the prospect of having better relations be-
tween the two countries is unlikely even with a change in the Administration).
157. Markey, supra note 37.
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[T]his number will continue to fall, in line with aid and as Colombia
takes over the maintenance of American-supplied helicopters and pi-
lot training. 163
Therefore, Chavez's language seems vague and exaggerated in order to
garner as much attention without having to make specific statements that
would require him to substantiate his claims with concrete proof.
Although war may be unlikely without a subsequent catalytic event oc-
curring, the perpetual tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, as
demonstrated by the verbal sparring, are unlikely to be calmed in the
long term considering the fact that the "two presidents rarely back down
from a fight." 164
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY
VENEZUELA ON THE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN COLOMBIA
AND VENEZUELA
The trade between the two countries may be something that may not
be resolved quickly, even though a war will likely not erupt over this dis-
pute. Unlike the disputes between the two countries in 2005 and 2008
that were quickly resolved, commentators have stated that Chavez is
more "serious about curtailing trade" with Colombia.165 Although
"many experts believe the proximity of Colombia and the long history of
trade and contacts mean two-way commerce will keep flowing,"166 recent
events demonstrate otherwise.
Colombia and Venezuela have a six to seven billion dollar annual bilat-
eral trade.167 Colombia exports food, leather, and textiles to Vene-
zuela.s68 In return, Venezuela, an OPEC country,169 exports fuel and
agrochemical products to Colombia. 170 At the same time, Venezuela has
been increasingly reliant on imports of natural gas from Colombia. 171 In
July 2009, Chavez said that he would halt all imports from Colombia.17 2
Then in October 2009, Chavez ordered a "freeze" on all imports from
Colombia. 173 To offset this loss of goods, including milk and meat,"74 into
163. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17.
164. Forero, supra note 39.
165. Markey, supra note 38.
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news-story.aspx?storyid=200906172041dowjonesdjonlineOO0898.
172. Helen Murphy & Alexander Cuadros, Uribe Urges Calm After Chavez Troops
Blow Up Bridges, BL OOMBERG, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601086&sid=AVPh.obsSfkQ.
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Venezuela, Chavez plans on increasing imports from Brazil and Argen-
tina.' 75 That same month, exports from Colombia to Venezuela fell sev-
enty-one percent compared to the trade in October 2008, the same month
the year before, as a result of the diplomatic dispute.' 76
Not only has Chavez ordered that trade be halted, he has ensured that
trade will not occur by destroying two pedestrian bridges along the bor-
der on November 19, 2010, claiming that "drugs and paramilitaries en-
tered Venezuela across the bridges, while smugglers carried food and fuel
through the area."' 77 Chavez has also ordered the expropriation of six
Exito stores in Venezuela, a French-Colombian owned retailer that was
operating stores in Venezuela.' 78 Chavez began the expropriation on
January 6, 2010, claiming that the store illegally raised prices in response
to Chavez's currency devaluation.179 Furthermore, he has rejected offers
from Colombia to sell electricity, despite the fact that Venezuela is cur-
rently suffering a severe shortage of energy.180 Therefore, Chavez's re-
cent actions will only deteriorate the tense relationship between
Venezuela and Colombia.
Unlike other disputes, this one has gained the attention of the Colom-
bian government and people, which may signify that it may have larger
consequences than prior disputes, especially considering that the trade
embargo has already lasted over six months. This may be especially true
because the Colombian central bank estimates that the sanctions from
Venezuelan may cost Colombia one-percent of its GDP. 181 Furthermore,
the Colombian Finance Minister Oscar Ivan Zuluaga predicts that eco-
nomic growth in 2010 will be hampered by the trade embargo with Vene-
zuela, "which accounts for about fifteen percent of Colombia's sales
abroad." 182 In reaction, Uribe has rightly contested the trade restrictions
by filing a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization's Com-
mittee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures claiming that the em-
bargo is a "'flagrant violation' of WTO norms. 183 Uribe has tried to solve
this issue diplomatically, unlike Chavez, by planning on denouncing the
acts before the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United
Nations Security Council.' 84
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Troops Shot Dead, supra note 138.
176. Colombia and the United States: Off Base, supra note 17. This downward slide has
continued: "[tlrade between the two countries has dropped 70 percent in April
[2010] as compared to the same period last year." Drost, supra note 174.
177. Murphy & Cuadros, supra note 172.
178. Venezuela Begins Expropriation of Six Exito Stores, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=AHlaUhzBMt2A.
179. Id.
180. Venezuela Spurns Colombian Electricity Offer, THE STAR, Feb. 16, 2010, http:/I
thestar.com.my/newslstory.asp?file=/201 0/2/16/apworld/2010021 6105953&sec=
APworld.
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Although Chavez will be able to maintain the trade embargo against
Colombia, by doing so he will only hurt Venezuela's economy and further
lose the respect of the international community, who sees his behavior as
increasingly irrational. It is likely that these trade restrictions imposed by
Chavez will also continue to significantly and negatively impact the Co-
lombian economy, unless there is an international intervention. But, the
WVTO does not seem to be interfering with the trade embargo except for
noting in its meeting that Venezuela asked for the complaint in writing
and Venezuela also suggested bilateral discussions would be more use-
ful.185 Venezuela also devalued its currency in January 2010, which will
further complicate its trade relationship with Colombia because doing so
makes imports from Colombia more expensive. 186
The WTO should intervene with this dispute sooner rather than later
because trade restrictions can have lasting and irreversible consequences
for the economic and diplomatic relations between Colombia and Vene-
zuela. If trade between the two countries is disrupted long-term, and the
countries begin trade agreements with other countries, there may not be
an economic incentive to promote diplomatic peace along the border. As
discussed above, a full out war is unlikely to erupt; however, more and
more smaller, yet still violent, clashes have occurred, likely as a result of
the growing economic tension due to the decreasing trade between the
two countries.
In the past, the "robust bilateral trade... .acted as a deterrent" for both
organized violence between the two countries and smaller violent
skirmishes along the border.187 If there is no bilateral trade to encourage
peaceful diplomatic relations, violence along the border may increase. So
far, there have been "frequent protests by truckers, local merchants, shop
workers, and people who depend on petty contraband for a living" along
the border protesting Chavez's restriction of trade. 188 With increased
tension and lack of economic stability, violence will escalate. Already,
the trade embargo "has thrown many people out of work in Venezuela's
border state of Thchira, aggravating a climate of lawlessness there." 189
Since many Colombians cross the Tachira River border by bridge either
by foot, bicycle, or motorcycle to get to work in Venezuela, 190 there will
likely be an increased number of unemployed people if people are unable
to cross the border. Unemployed workers with no prospect for employ-
185. World Trade Organization, Transparency Deal Emerging for Developing Nations'
Treatment in Food Safety and Related Issues, Oct. 28-29, 2009, http://www.wto.orgI
english/news-e/news09-e/sps-28octO9-e.htm.
186. Update 2-Colombia Fears Pain from Venezuela Devaluation, REUTERS, Jan. 10,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1012815520100110.
187. Patrick Markey, Scenarios: How Far Will Colombia- Venezuela Crisis Worsen?,
REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AJ4E3200911I
20.
188. Humberto Marquez, Colombia- Venezuela: Border Killings Heat Up Tension, IPS
NEWS, Nov. 4, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49140.
189. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
190. Constanza Viera, Colombia- Venezuela: Diplomatic Crisis Worries Border Dwell-
ers, IPS NEWS, Nov. 29, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40279.
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ment in the future and without necessary resources and food from across
the border because of the trade embargo may be forced to resort to vio-
lence for survival. Already, "paramilitaries working in the border area
whom, since greater restrictions were placed on the border crossing by
Chavez... .have stepped up their threats, in particular against the National
Guard." 191 As discussed above, there has also been the murder of eleven
civilians and two murders of national guardsmen along the border.192
Therefore, Venezuela's trade restrictions have likely furthered violence
along the region.
Instead of hastening a resolution between the two countries, the trade
restrictions may actually entrench the two countries into a longer conflict.
Therefore, the international community, such as UNASUR, should focus
on the trade restrictions between Colombia and Venezuela as a pathway
to addressing the larger dispute between the two countries.
D. POTENTIAL OF UNASUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA's FUTURE
RELATIONS WITH UNASUR
Because of Colombia's continued alliance with the United States, Co-
lombia is becoming increasingly "isolated diplomatically as Mr. Chavez
presses ahead with his efforts to expand Venezuela's oil diplomacy while
eroding American influence in the hemisphere."'ll9 3 Venezuela, Ecuador,
and Nicaragua are already part of a leftist political alliance headed by
Chavez.194 This alliance between the three countries, who are "wary of
American influence in the region," likely prompted Ecuador's decision to
end a ten year agreement between Ecuador and the United States which
had previously allowed "E-3 AWACs and P-3 Orion surveillance plans to
operate from the Manta Air Base on Ecuador's Pacific Coast."195 Cur-
rently, Colombia has become increasingly diplomatically distanced from
both Brazil and Chile because of the DCA and the lack of consultation or
information to Colombia's neighbors in South America before the agree-
ment was announced. 196
Because Colombia is already diplomatically isolated within the region,
some within the country have argued that it should leave UNASUR.197
Arguing that the UNSAUR is a "useless, biased bureaucracy," one Co-
lombian commentator noted that the region is a "hostile territory for Co-
lombia's alliance with the United States."'198 But, this hostile relationship
191. Hursthouse, supra note 124.
192. Venezuela and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
193. Romero, supra note 3.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Colombia and the United States: Off Bose, supra note 17.
197. E.g., Sebastian Castaneda, Colombia Should Leave UNASUR, COLOMBIA RE-
PORTrs, Dec. 2, 2009, http://colombiareports.com/opinion/cantonese-arepasnl150-
colombia-should-Ieave-unasur.html; Cano, supra note 93.
198. Cano, supra note 93.
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only furthers the argument that Colombia must remain in the UNASUR,
if only to hope for better relations in the future. It would be reckless for
Colombia to hastily leave UNASUR due to the DCA with the United
States because of the negative implications it could have for the future of
the region. Even though Colombia should not leave UNASUR, Colom-
bia is justified in continuing to resist UNASUR attempts to control and
oversee Colombian bilateral agreements.
Even though the United States has repeatedly stated what the DCA is
intended to do during negotiations and through press releases, 199 the
vagueness of public announcements and the lack of transparency regard-
ing the DCA, especially in light of the Air Force Document that was
taken off the internet after criticism, has justifiably concerned Venezuela
and other UNASUR countries. As discussed above, the Air Force Docu-
ment stated the possibility of using the newly formed bases in Colombia
to defend against attacks from neighboring countries.200 Instead of
shrouding the Document in secrecy, the United States should have been
more transparent about the agreement. 201
Initially, the United States should have allowed all of the UNASUR
countries the ability to view the agreement before it was signed. If the
United States was hesitant about open communication, Colombia should
have persuaded the United States to be more open to safeguarding Co-
lombia's political security in the region. Thus, the initial concerns the
UNASUR countries had would at least be based on the actual text of the
DCA, rather than on mere speculations about what the DCA may or may
not agree to. In addition, Colombia should have attempted to cooperate
more with the United States and UNASUR, rather than turning their
backs to UNASUR, by complying with the request from UNASUR coun-
tries for the text of the agreement after initial announcement of the re-
port.202 As fully discussed below, this was not required under the
UNASUR constitution, 203 but disclosure to UNASUR members would
have benefited Colombia. Instead, by continuing to refuse to communi-
cate openly, Colombia is only isolating itself more in Latin America and
then attempting to hide behind the military shield of the United States.
But, at the same time, the United States has been criticized for also
"abandoning" Colombia during this conflict:
199. See Clinton, supra note 8.
200. Interview with Julia E. Sweig, supra note 20.
201. See Clarity About the DCA Could Reduce Tensions, Ti-n CENTER FOR INT'L
PoC''s COLOM. PROGRAM, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=1218 (argu-
ing that "(1) [t]he United States must be clearer with Colombia's neighbors that its
presence in Colombia will never support any operations beyond Colombian soil;
(2) [tlhe United States must be clearer about the commitment that this agreement
implies for Colombia's national defense," and "(3) [t]he United States must be
clearer about its desire to see the Colombia-Venezuela tensions resolved
peacefully").
202. Sarah Stephens, Why Latin America is Disappointed with Barack Obama, Hui-
FINGTON Pos-i-, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-stephens/why-
latin-america-is-disa-b_415341 .html.
203. See UNASUR Treaty, supra note 86.
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If the mute behavior of a bloc [UNASUR] to which Colombia be-
longs is surprising in the face of President Chavez's wild insults, war-
like threats and provocative acts, the attitude of our great ally to the
north [referring to the United States] is nothing less than outrageous.
Washington not only seeks to distance itself, but has sought to place
both governments' conduct on a sort of equal footing.204
Colombia, consequently, would be ill advised to rely on their relation-
ship with the United States to pull them out of this diplomatic mess.
Therefore, even though Colombia "leaving UNASUR would be an act of
political bravery,"1205 it would also be political suicide at a time that Co-
lombia cannot afford to have declining diplomatic relations.
While the agreement formation process was not transparent, the
United States may be stepping up to Colombia's defense when the
United States agreed in January 2010 to discuss the DCA with
UNASUR. 206 Clinton stated that there is an "interest in getting close to
this organization" to the Ecuadorian President and UNSUAR pro
tempore President Rafael Correa,207 who had previously requested an ur-
gent meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in August 2009.208
Thus, if UNASUR and the United States are able to communicate and
effectively cooperate with each other, Colombia may be able to better
their relations with UNASUR. If there is better communication between
the United States, Colombia, and UNASUR about what the DCA actu-
ally does authorize, UNASUR, and its member countries, may be less
apprehensive about the agreement.
Although the United States and Colombia are not innocent in this es-
calating tension, UNASUR should also be held accountable for its role in
this conflict. Rather than trying to negotiate between the countries to
reach a settlement, UNASUR is only intensifying the verbal conflict be-
tween Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States by requesting more
and more information and attempting to put restrictions on countries'
bilateral agreements.209 Rather than the UNASUR urging open talks
and negotiations to calm the two countries, only the Organization of
American States (OAS) seems to be "urging talks," with Brazil and the
Dominican Republic offering to serve as negotiators. 210 Even though the
OAS seems willing to facilitate negotiations between Colombia and Ven-
ezuela, Venezuela has been arguing that it will only accept mediation
through UNASUR because the DCA is threatening the regional integra-
204. What Have You Done for Me Lately?, supra note 29.
205. Cano, supra note 93.
206. U.S. Agrees to Hold Dialogue with UNASUR, PE-OPLE's DAlILY, Jan. 21, 2010, http:/
/english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90852/6875378.html.
207. Id.
208. UNASUR: Correa Proposes Meeting with Obamna, MomiNTro 24, Aug. 28, 2009,
http://momento24.com/en/2009/08/28/unasur-correa-proposes-meeting-with-
obamnal.
209. See e.g., id; US Agrees to Hold Dialogue with UNASUR, supra note 206.
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tion of South America specifically. 211 Considering the membership in
GAS includes all thirty-five countries of North and South America, in-
cluding the United States,'2 12 Venezuela may be unwilling to engage in
negotiations with GAS because of possible involvement by the United
States.
Even though Colombia disagrees with some of the current policies of
the UNASUR, Colombia should continue being a member of UNASUR
and must respect the organization because of the possibility of better re-
lations in the future. It has been argued that Colombia's decision to ig-
nore the concerns from UNASUR has "weakened faith in
multilateralism."12 13 Therefore, it is argued that the result of this conflict
"is an overall reduction in the value of such efforts at integration that
might have acted as safeguards against war."12 14 Not only has Colombia
ignored the concerns from UNASUR, it has decided to bypass UNASUR
and file complaints with the Organization of American States (GAS) and
the United Nations Security Council.215 Even though the organization
may not seem as effective as expected, Colombia must retain membership
in UNASUR because UNASUR still has the potential to achieve its l1ofty
goals. Therefore, Colombia should try to communicate through
UNASUR rather than just bypassing the organization by filing com-
plaints with GAS and the UN.
Even though Colombia's disregard of UNASUR could be considered
to weaken the central authority of UNASUR, Colombia was and is under
no obligation to comply with every demand of the organization. The pre-
amble to the UNASUR constitution states clearly that there is an "unlim-
ited respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of
States."12 16 Thus, the UNASUR must honor the "sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity" of Colombia to make bilateral agreements with another
country regardless of consultation or approval of the agreement, because
it is a sovereign independent nation.217 Consequently, Colombia's refusal
211. Venezuela-Colombia Relations Keep Worsening, Ei- UNIVERSAL, Nov. 27, 2009,
http://english.eluniversal.com/2009/11/27/en-ing-.esp-.venezuela-colombia-r-27A3
125811 .shtml.
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states/member-states.asp (last visited June 4, 2010).
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to agree at a UNASUR meeting in September that "military agreements
with countries outside the UNASUR bloc should be approved by it" was
legally justified.218 An independent nation should have the ability to
make contracts with other countries without the supervening nature of
approval by an intergovernmental organization. There is nothing in the
UNASUR Constitution that provides the member states are legally obli-
gated to consult with UNASUR before making agreements. 219 Rather,
UNASUR seems to offer "a space for consultation in order to reinforce
South American integration and the participation of UNASUR in the in-
ternational area" if a country wishes to take opportunity of it,2 2 0 but the
Constitution does not command consultation.
But, Colombia's second refusal at the September UNASUR meeting to
provide "real security guarantees for the region's countries regarding the
U.S.'s agreement with Colombia 221 was less justified if Colombia was
committed to transparency and fully cooperating with the UNASUR.
Unlike UNASUR's first request that all agreements should be approved
by UNASUR, this request seems to some extent reasonable. An organi-
zation that is committed to the "strengthening of multilateralismn and the
rule of law in international relations in order to achieve a multipolar, bal-
anced[,]and just world" through integration of the countries222 would
have a justified interest in maintaining security in the region. There is a
heightened interest if this conflict, especially the American involvement
in the conflict, truly "constitutes a grave danger for peace in Latin
America" according to Ecuadorian President and UNSUAR pro tempore
President Rafael Correa.223 It seems like an admirable goal for the
UNASUR to want to be consulted about international agreements, but
without the expectation of being able to forbid the agreement from being
made. Instead, there is a continued lack of transparency and a lack of
communication with UNASUR. Thus, Venezuela continues to speculate
that Colombia is refusing to provide information to UNASUR and its
member countries because of the true reasons for the DCA.2 24
Considering that Colombia was not consulted as a member of
UNASUR when Chavez initiated bilateral agreements with Russia or
previous agreements signed by Colombia. Why must Colombia submit itself to
scrutiny by other UNASUR nations on this matter? Why should the rest of South
America have the privilege of questioning Colombia's foreign and domestic poli-
cies?" Cano, supra note 93.
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ANAL YSIS, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/4800.
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China,225 it does not seem just for Chavez to now insist on disclosure or
consultation for Colombia's agreements. Therefore, if Venezuela were
arguing for consultation and approval in this situation, it would require
Venezuela to go through the same diplomatic procedure for any bilateral
agreements it would make in the future. If Venezuela was Colombia's
situation, it would likely also be protesting the demands of other coun-
tries and UNASUR. Thus, UNASUR should not be permitted to argue
authority over this agreement now when UNASUR failed to exercise this
supposed authority in the past.
Although Colombia has the authority to contest UNASUR's restric-
tions about its sovereign authority to enter into bilateral agreement, Co-
lombia must continue to communicate and cooperate with UNASUR to
hope to maintain collaboration in the region. Although Colombia may
think it can suffice with support from the United States, Colombia needs
UNASUR involvement in the future for continued peace and stability in
the region.
VII. CONCLUSION
The DCA between the United States and Colombia has far-reaching
consequences for the relations between the South American countries
and the South American region and the United States. While a war is
unlikely to occur as a consequence from the Venezuela-Colombia conflict
and the DCA, this agreement will continue to tear apart the diplomatic
relations between Colombia and Venezuela, the entire South American
region, and United States relations with the South American region for at
least a decade, which is the length of the DCA. The DCA may not be the
catalyst that causes Colombia and Venezuela to erupt into a conventional
war from a mere verbal war, but eventually there may be an event that
does escalate the situation into more than just Chavez's ceaseless rheto-
ric. If and when that event does occur, Colombia will need to rely on its
UNASUR membership to attempt to end any conflict diplomatically
rather than militarily. Therefore, Colombia needs to maintain its mem-
bership in the organization while asserting its sovereignty at the same
time. Furthermore, the international community must interfere with
Venezuela's trade embargo in an attempt to continue to have a multi-
billion dollar deterrent to an actual war. This situation should demon-
strate to the United States that it should be more hesitant the next time it
enters into a defense cooperation agreement with another country be-
cause it may be unnecessary for future relationships and could have long-
lasting implications for U.S. relations. Overall, this conflict between Co-
lombia and Venezuela demonstrates how one, perhaps unnecessary,
agreement could spark a multitude of consequences: threatened war,
225. Colombia's foreign minister stated: "[w]e never expressed our opinion in what our
neighbors do.. . Not even when the Russian presence became known in Venezue-
lan waters, or with relations with China." Romero, supra note 3; see also Venezuela
and Colombia: Jaw-Jaw War, supra note 56.
2010] 585
586 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
verbal assaults between leaders of neighboring countries, declining diplo-
matic relations between two countries, a multi-billion dollar trade em-
bargo, and international legal questions regarding membership in an
intergovernmental organization.
